Welfare Economics of Arrow, Hicks, Pareto et al for World Economic Development.
Introduction: Marshallian necessary goods and services such as Food, Clothing and Shelter, even after centuries of modern history, since the days of Industrial Revolution, the French Revolution, the Indian Independence of 1947, the Green Revolution of India, did not see the end of the tunnel. In darkness, social injustice, human rights violation, neglected health services, ignorance, famine, and poverty, life of helplessness persist for billions of people on Mother Earth. Mother she is, with some children prosperous, and many in distress. Science and Technology, rationality of Economics and Political Science have not yet been seriously applied to assure health of the globe and happiness of mankind.
Sir John Kicks in the tradition of Marshall and Pigou, in the World Economics outlines New Welfare Economics, which many of us have not cultivated. Costs and benefits, short-term and long-term dynamics, causes and effects in Economics have remained neglected areas, because, the study of Economics in both developed and developing economics got delinked from Philosophy and Political Science; partly the explosion of Knowledge has thrown scholars apart and partly neglect of the higher values of life, made Economics mechanical, and less human. Economists are not Concerned with Value Judgments and Ethics, according to Lionel Robbins. Labour and enterprise, have been kept in watertight compartments, in ancient times, when a few could study and rest would be hewers of wood and drawers of water. Modern science has made it possible for all persons to be literate, educated and innovative. Writers like Kindleberger, have stated, and Professor W.W.Rostow has demonstrated in their authentic studies of growth processes, that building and construction could be engines of growth for sustained development. Professor Arthur W.Lewis, the founder of the new discipline of Economics of Growth, implied the use of skilled and unutilised manpower for construction to ensure increase in real income.
Global interest in housing as priority: The United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (UNCHS) have given attention to this issue, and have prepared several studies with national perspectives. However, in developing and developed countries, housing finance is subject to a measure of speculation which is unique to long-term calculations and highly durable assets. The clean India Policy hopes to provide at least toilets, if not houses.
If we define the poor as those who cannot save enough, we can meet the gap. On the other hand, if the poor save “Zero’ sums, then self-reliance becomes “Zero”, and the total effect on the Economy by such motivation is not conducive to growth. Some saving, rather than no saving, is the first principle. Granted this, one should be sure of the circular flow of income. The materials used, the labour employed, and technology chosen, may have something to do with income and work, which the builder per se or the community could generate.
The World Bank, is the subject of debate from the angle of development alternatives. As a banker, the rate of return on investment is important to them. But that is not all. The lender and borrower are partners in development strategy. Consultations and continued dialogue on schedules and reschedules, are necessary and possible to the extent not widely perceived. The Indian experience is interesting. Many Indian economists who have been advising the World Bank, could not advise their own government. And when their advice is routed through the World Bank, it is deemed anti-national. The issues are more complex than they seem at first. Funded largely by countries, and capital markets, keen on the solvency of the World Bank, the economists there, make sure, of the health of the country to which they lend money. In their anxiety they get involved in domestic policy making.
We have argued the case for considering housing as the main economic activity for economic development. Marshall to Rostow, Adam Smith to Arthur W Lewis would commend this policy. This is welfare economics housing for the individual and for all human beings from the global perspective of macro and microeconomics. The 21st century Sociology, culture, management, economics, and environmental sciences have to pool their resources for making the earth a safe and sufficient place to live. Land is a scarce factor; it has to be put to alternative uses. Dr.Arcot Ramachandran UNCHS Director in Nairobi has done a pioneering work in the first two foundation decades, and the humanity of the future could build upon these global foundations, the perspectives for the 21 century.
A definitional clarification of Welfare Economics: To the modern economist as it was to his counterparts in the earlier periods, the content of welfare economics is still a baffling problem. The varying underlying philosophies stand in the way of a consensus of opinion as to what properly the term should connote. Framing an unambiguous basis for a satisfactory welfare definition is essential for the work of a the economist. Regarding the definition of welfare, theoretical economists are constantly suggesting that specific modifications are possible in the direction of welfare. To that extent there has been a substantial contribution to the content and scope of welfare for over five centuries. Even though economics in the final analysis is a branch of ethics, it is not easy to relate economic value to ethical value because of the difficulty of obtaining an objective content for value or welfare in ethical sense. Ultimately all ethical values are asthetic and personal. Hobson made an effort at finding some such objective standard. But in his desire to avoid the old mysticism of ‘social values’ “he failed miserably, since he was caught between the necessity of finding some standardisation and the desire to avoid it in the interest of freedom and personality.
Pigouvian Welfare Economics: “Welfare” according to A.C Pigou, “is of very wide range”. The elements of welfare are states of consciousness and their relations and it can be brought under the category of greater or less. But he is not satisfied with such a conception for “an analysis of its causes would be enormous and impracticable”. Hence he attempts to delimit the subject matter in order to ‘advantageously’ utilize the methods of science. The instrument chosen for scientific precision by him is money that ‘is available in social life’. Thereby the range of enquiry becomes restricted to that part of social welfare which is amenable to measurement through money either directly or indirectly. This restricted part he calls economic welfare. Even several decades after the publication of his ‘Economics of Welfare’, this conceptualisation seemed to be disturbing him. In his last article on Welfare Economics he says: “Economic Welfare of an individual is somehow resident in his state of mind or consciousness”. Material Welfare taken loosely as man’s income or possession is not welfare, though it may be a means to it. “Certainly it is not identical with or part of it.” He further adds “as it seems to me, welfare must be taken to refer either to the goodness of a man’s state of mind or to the satisfaction embodied in it … Welfare refers to satisfaction, not goodness”.
Pigou, who made a fervent plea for State intervention on welfare grounds, now justified that “in certain circumstances a Government ought to foster a situation embodying less welfare” (but more goodness) in preference to one embodying more welfare. His conception of welfare is made very clear. A man’s welfare consists only in his satisfaction and this satisfaction does not mean simply happiness or pleasure. He employs the word utility to mean satisfaction. Thus a man’s welfare in economic terms is made up of his utilities.
The later writings of Pigou, therefore, clearly indicate the changing content of welfare in his writings. The goal aimed at by Pigou was “to make easy practical measures to promote welfare”. In Wealth and Welfare, it was stated that “welfare means the same thing as good” but this proposition was dropped from his Economics of Welfare. He then explains welfare as “a thing of wide range” … the elements of welfare are states of consciousness and perhaps their relations; secondly that welfare can be brought under the category of greater and less. Here the Marshallian influence is very much felt. But in the later writing of Pigou, “welfare is not the same thing as good.” Welfare is wriggled off from goodness.
The Pigovian tradition seemed to have continued for quite sometime in Cambridge which is evident from Robertson’s interpretation of economic welfare. In his critical assessment of utility which Robertson delivered as a course of lectures, he does not differ from Pigou’s stand. Robertson categorically affirms that the subject matter of economics is economic welfare. The changes in production and distribution are to be studied with a view to discovering their effects on economic Welfare. Like Pigou he admits that economic welfare is only part of Welfare as a whole. Possible harmonies between the two are recognised but holds on to the presumption that what promotes the one will promote the other. To dispel the notion that the phrase ‘economic welfare’ is bulging with ethics and emotiveness, Robertson prefers to use the word ‘Ecfare’ instead.
Hickian Welfare Econnomics: J.R.Hicks, who Jointly with K.J.Arrow won the Noble Price, has been a mentor for many NLs. The lecture of Hicks inspired Arrow to choose his area of research. And Paul Samuelson acknowledges his learning from Hicks of Oxford University in his award winning work Foundations of Economic Analysis (Harvard,1948) as a scholar in Harvard. Hicks considers all goods and services which have value are related to welfare economics. “Pigou’s contention is that the concern of the economist is with a part of general welfare which he calls economic welfare.” The trouble starts according to him when the “philosopher tells us that social good is not a thing which can be divided into parts”. Hicks wants to paint on a wider canvass than Pigou when it comes to economic welfare. He feels that economic welfare can be “conceived as something wider than this”. He would define welfare economics so as to include subjective elements, ‘surpluses which are not fully expressed in the money value of goods and services as well as the efforts and sacrifices which are involved and perhaps savings also’. Thus he includes even those elements that could be, brought indirectly into relation with the ‘measuring rod of money’. Even after having made such an extension, the characteristic feature of ‘Economic Welfarism’, viz. that the ends of economic life are within economics, is quite in tact. As for the question of disharmony between general welfare and economic welfare, Hicks resolves that “if the economist has shown that a particular course of action is to be recommended for economic reasons, he has done his job”.
The Hicksian School has Graaf, Reder and Little: This group of economists are bundled together as New Welfare Economists, distinct from the Pigovian school of thought. Reder, for instance, looks at Welfare Economics as that attempting to “establish and apply criteria of propriety to economic policies.” Reder is only adopting what has become almost the standard definition. This group of economists of do not attempt to give a ‘content to the idea of welfare’ following the Paretian method of tackling the problem. They only define a welfare indicator, which increases or decreases with welfare. The indicator is this: welfare increases or decreases whenever one or more individuals become more or less satisfied without any other individual becoming less (more) satisfied. This thread runs through the writings of Hicks, Hotelling, Kaldor, Lange, Lerner and Scitovsky. This standard procedure of the new welfare economists has been well substantiated by the compensation principle. Introduction of compensation principle lifts up welfare economics from its sterile level. Its criteria would be only applicable to the few policies that harm no one.
The dichotomy between the two schools of thought clearly emerges. The economists’ contention of welfare up to Pigou–for whom welfare is a state of consciousness–has been a subjective one. The school of new welfare thought maintains an element of objectivity by closely linking welfare to individual choices. For them a person’s welfare map is identical with his preference map. Thus we find that Graafi confines himself to the study of welfare, satisfying the Pareto condition, viz. an increase in one man’s welfare, with the welfare of the group remaining the same leads to an increase in social welfare known as the Paretian Welfare function. The contention of new welfarists is that when an individual moves to a higher indifference curve (i.e.) when he expands the effective area of choice, his welfare is increased. The implication is that the individual is the best judge of his own well-being. Unless his ranking is accepted his preference field is irrelevant as an index of his welfare. Bergson took the study further ahead when he evolved the Bergsonian Social Welfare function which sums up all the individual welfares. The speciality of an ethical property is attributed to this function, viz, that at least one is better off, when no one is worse off and the entire community is better off.
Kenneth Arrow and New Social Welfare Function: The major issues of welfare economics according to him are (a) increasing or maximising of ‘community welfare’ (b) the precise statement of the optimum conditions, (c) the circumstances where these conditions diverge with the operations of perfect competition (in this respect he has not made many strides from Pigou), (d) the implications of (b) and (c) for practical economic policy and finally (e) the choice between capitalism and socialism and the proper policies under each. A more practical translation of Bergson’s social welfare functions is to be found in Oscar Lange. Through empirical observation the administration of scarce resources can be evaluated in terms of certain social objectives. From this certain rules for use of scarce resources can be framed which are conducive to the attainment of social objectives. Such use is referred to as ‘ideal’ use. These provide standards against which to evaluate the actual use of resources. A comparison of the two measures may be recommended to bring actual use to the ‘ideal’ use. This correspondence according to Lange, provides the subject matter of welfare economics which he otherwise calls as normative economics or social economics. The rule of ‘ideal’ use of resources in terms of desired social objectives becomes a special kind of economic law. Thus it is made convenient to include welfare economics in theoretical economics, “a supplementary branch of the latter.” wants and their satisfaction a prominent part of economics. “His science of wants supplemented his science of efforts”. Marshall’s idea of “necessary goods and services” included efficient living and especially the consumer’s surplus and his most noted contribution of his study relates both wealth and man. The standard of living as Marshall emphasized is found in man and not in his institutions. However, Marshall did not rigidly hold on to this classical idea as did Long ago. Adam Smith and J.S. Mill found the level of standard of living in man and not in his collective representations, which view is also to be justified in the broader perspective of their laissez—faire doctrine. Sturmey relating income to economic welfare takes a similar but emphatic stand. The total welfare is made up of all the things we enjoy. Despite the impossibility that total welfare cannot be split up, a large part of the happiness desired by individuals is from “taings obtainable with money”. This is economic welfare, the level of which is often referred to as the standard of living. But he has a broader concept of the standard of living. It is much more than “a count of things his income buys” for it includes “socially provided services”. Therefore, economic welfare is equivalent to all things money can buy either by the individual himself “received in kind or provided collectively by the State”.
Welfare Economics and Income: The symbol of this economic welfare both of individual or community as whole is income. Starting from the Pigovian stand point it looks as though we have made a long journey but in the end we find ourselves again in the Pigovian camp-site. As Stigler said the view of economists regarding welfare has undergone a complete cycle since the beginning of 19th century.’ Surveying the development of Welfare Economics in the early 50’s Boulding still feels uneasy about the subject. “It is almost as difficult to define the boundaries of welfare economics as it is to define economics itself.” The line between what is and what is not welfare economics is not yet clear. Either we could include almost any discussion of economic policy raising matters of principles and invoking standards of judgment, or it could be outright narrowed down to highly technical discussions of the conditions for a social optimum. Similarly, the advances made in theorizing welfare economics could hardly convince I.M.D. Little who feels that the science has not yet shorn off its emotive significance. The concept of an increase or change in welfare makes good sense” implying that economic change is favourable to individual happiness. But the phrase welfare of the community is still not clear and definite. A critical evaluator like Hutchinson also gives the same opinion. He says that very common and indefinite use has been made of the term welfare economics. Despite a “sufficient coverage” it has never had any “precise, widely-accepted place or function in economics”, excepting arousing people’s emotions. Because of its affinity to ethics, welfare economics can hardly rise to the scientific standards sought to be achieved.
The only way out according to Little is to give a criterion acceptable to the majority of the people in the prevailing climate of ethical opinion. To the great expectations of Pigou, the ‘economic man’, the pivot around whom the science of economics revolves, the hopes are bright. The two important attitudes of this economic man are that he is not affected by what is happening to others and that the end of economic activity is solely in terms of marketable output. Pigou allows for the external economies, the negation of the first attribute but clings to the existence of only marketable output. In this sense Pigvian welfare economics fails to “tear itself away completely from the notion of Economic Man.” Further, three basic objectives are raised by Majumdar questioning Pigou’s definition. Firstly, with regard to describing satisfaction as “a thing which can be brought under the category of greater or less”, rather “premature if not misleading.” The two kinds of enjoyments form the different commodities and they are not just comparable according to Majumdar. But in view of the elaborate devices that the critics have worked out, unless some such assumption is made there is no possibility of building up a theory either. Pigou’s assumption supplemented by Marshall’s consumer’s surplus principal can be safely taken as a safe premise to go further ahead. Secondly, treating of streams of real aggregate income as indications of the positive elements of economic welfare is objected to since he assumed away the problem of distribution of that income. The careful perusal of the later chapters on redistribution clearly reveals that Pigou did make special note of this particular situation. Thirdly, the objection is with regard to narrowly identifying the pursuit of welfare economics solely in terms of consumption and production of National Income. It is complained that Pigou’s identification of economic activity with productive activity has led to this narrow conception. This objection is not altogether a separate one. It is rather implicit in the second objection. Economic activity may comprehend production, consumption and distribution, but these distinct activities do not pertain to three different magnitudes — what is produced, distributed and consumed in the entire process further leading to redistribution. Hence the third objection of Majumdar cannot be taken as a main objection a6ainst Pigou.
The Three Schools of Welfare Economics: Corresponding to the basic conception regarding the content of welfare economics, three distinct standards of thought could be identified. Firstly, the Pigovian approach, giving cardinality to welfare which is measured through national dividend, analyses the doctrine of maximum satisfaction under competitive conditions at high levels of abstraction and precision. Earlier, Marshall also briefly discussed the doctrine of maximum satisfaction for competitive conditions and gave an abstract analysis of it.
But the notion of maximum happiness originated from Bentham. Bentham did not have any considerable impact on English Political Economy during the 19th century. He merely exhorted the economists to “search for nothing less than the greatest possible sum total of pleasure summed through all time and over all sentience”. But he did not pursue deeper than this by examining the maximum satisfaction doctrine. Only with the formulation of the marginal utility theory of value that the doctrine of maximum satisfaction emerged in a closely reasoned form. The Benthamite idea of equal distribution of income found justification through the principle of diminishing marginal utility. Walras’ general theory further fortified the doctrine that free competition invariably leads to maximum satisfaction. But the other Economists who are the principal authorities in the first group, viz. Jevons, Sidgwick, Marshall and Pigou did not fully exploit this Wairasian analysis. Secondly, those who adopted Paretian line of thinking which allowed only ordinarily to economic welfare by which comparisons of more or less was possible and not abs6lute measurability, undertook the empirical ease by case reviews’ of economic policies. The whole group of economists connected with new welfare economics come under this category. Thirdly, those who conceived economic welfare in terms of a social welfare function analysed the possible workings of a collectivist economy as compared with the individualist and competitive economy. Bergson, who initiated this distinct group, is followed by Lerner to some extents and by Lange, Lancaster and Arrow. Some writers on welfare economics contributed to all the three approaches while others dealt with anyone of them.
The relationship between individual welfare and group welfare: It is very important in welfare economics. The transition from individual to group welfare can be made in three ways. Firstly, when the group welfare is completely dire from individual welfare it is called Paternalistic.1 The economists do not have much to do in this case since the State or Paternalist authority entertairs its own idea about welfare. The underlying basis of the second is the impossibility of interpersonal comparisons of utility. Welfare of a group in this case is no more than a heterogeneous collection of individual welfare. This is the approach adopted by Pareto and his follower Barone. This has led to the celebrated criteria for a maximum of group welfare, viz. that it is not possible to make anyone better off without making at least one worse off. Hicks, Kaldor, Scitovsky ars3 members of this group. The third approach emerges from the recognition that interpersonal comparison can be admitted with ethical judgment. Bergson’s social welfare function of the individualist employs this. From the foregoing, three levels of welfare analysis could be identified. Myint recognises three levels of welfare analysis: “physical level” (‘qualities of economic welfare are propositional quantities of physical products). The physical level of analysis is identified with the work of the classicists — Smith, Ricardo, Mill etc., since they neglected the question whether the output pattern is properly adjusted to the pattern of consumer demands. Instead they evaluate the economic system and view its success in maximising aggregate output. A “subjective level” where quantities of economic welfare are proportional to quantities of satisfaction of given and constant individual wants) Two major strains are recognized. Firstly, the general Optimum Theory stemming from Pareto, Wicksell, Barone, and secondly the surplus analysis characteristic of Marshall and his follower Pigou. Contemporary Welfare economics unifies these two strains. An “ethical level” concerned with the quantitative measurement of success in given ends but with the appraisal of the ethical utility of the ends themselves. A further distinction can be made as between the allocation approach and the piecemeal approach roughly approximating to the Laximum satisfaction and the case-by-case approach discussed earlier the general allocation approach is directed at a best position for the community and the comparative and piecemeal analysis is concerned with the task of ascertaining a better position for society. Both are complementary for “in moving from one better position to another we are in effect moving closer to a best position.” The allocation approach in welfare economics has evolved a good number of allocation rules to identify the optimum position. There is already a long tradition of distinguishing private and social benefit or private and social cost. But the piecemeal approach in contrast to this has been so absorbed in the “intricacies arising from different notions of hypothetical compensation” that they have overlooked the former aspect. However, the general allocation analysis does not hold out much hope in solving the problem of welfare. Comparatively the piecemeal analysis holds out more prospects since arbitrating between two economic situations with some small change is not ‘outside the bounds of possibility.”
A mixed approach to welfare economics: It is evident from the writings of Little, F.M. Fisher, and Hicks who do not limit their criteria to levels of production alone and therefore explicitly consider distribution. Little and Fisher admit social orderings different distributions and Hicks looks for an empirical generalization about the distributional impact of a sequence of production changes. Briefly Little’s approach is this. He retains the Scitovsky critrian along with the assumption that ‘relative’ real income distribution can be evaluated. He compares an initial position with an altered state in which both the level of production and pattern of distribution are different. Similarly Fisher’s focus is on the question, which of the alternatives is better or worse or indifferent. Distinguishing between income and distribution, he characterizes income in terms of commodities and not ‘real income’. This strengthens the empirical viability. He considers some initial total distribution of commodities called a social state. This space of social state is partitioned into social states. This is to indicate the set of social states preferable, inferior and indifferent to it. This is accomplished in three stages. Firstly, in an ambiguous partitioning accepting unanimity (level of production) as a value judgment. (Similar to Pareto Optimal Analysis). Secondly, the extension of the comparable alternatives to the different distributions of the level of income stipulated in the first stage. Thirdly, more alternatives are compared with the initial state introducing value judgment which establishes the required minimum changes in income to “make the initial state socially indifferent to some particular redistribution of the initial income level.”
Though Fisher’s method increases the range of choices over which actual welfare comparisons can be made without the need for compensation, his model, however does not represent an achievement for the New Welfare Economics. The comparability is achieved by Fisher solely by the introduction of value judgment about income and distribution which is the very thing New Welfare Economics seeks to avoid. The improvement made by Fisher rests in expressing the distributive preference indirectly in terms of commodities rather than directly through money income. It is essentially an “improved variant” of Bergson’s distribution consensus approach. But income changes are sufficient indices of actual welfare changes only where the accompanying distributional changes are either advantageous or sufficiently disadvantageous. Hicks approach is quite district from this. Though distributional matters are important, “they ought to be excluded in the matters of practical policy”. This is not the final position taken by Hicks but held earlier. All the same it influenced others as well. Every policy which promotes the increase in income in the sense of total value of outputs (i.e.) every policy which has the property that prospective gainer could completely compensate prospective loser and still be better off by the change, should be adopted without paying compensation. In the long run everyone will (probably) in fact be better off than if a different principle had been followed. In other words, Hicks recommends every policy that increases potential welfare which is explicitly related to actual welfare changes. This is a mixed approach where distributional considerations are present but on a different level of discourse compared to the other approaches.
Relevance of Pareto to World Economic Development: Italian and Swedish economic systems and their economists have made lasting influence on British and American economists. Vilfredo Pareto (15 July 1848 – 19 Aug.1923) is reputed for what is known as Pareto Optimality. An economy is in a Pareto Optimality when no further changes in the economy can make one person better off without at the same time making another worse off. This is a version only a mathematician like Pareto can formulate. And economists gulp it as axiom. It is an ideal. Every thing is in balance. Any change is less ideal. The question is how do we apply to a community or a group of people, or a group of nations like ASEAN, BRICKS OR Commonwealth of Nations. Pareto’s Italy had 20 % of population owning 80 % of land and he thought of ideal distribution. In India there are urban centres or states consisting of rich industrialists and business men who own 80% of income by less than 5% of population. Pareto principle wise in a group of nations economic policies and relations can be such no one state is better off without making another state worse off. This is a guide line. Environmental conflicts between rich and poor nations reveal Pareto as an idealist. And that in his closing years he turned to be a Sociologist rather than an Economist or Mathematician, that re declined offer of parliamentary positions reveal that Pareto is an idealist. The ideal world can follow Pareto Optimality. Economics should rejoin Ethics, Political Science, and Philosophy. This is the real lesson of Pareto Optimality and New Welfare Economics. Economics should shun neutrality between ends. The ethical ideal not to make one nation worse off in the process of another nation better off, is a great ideal. The Law of the Jungle is for the stronger animal to eat the weak. Global body politic is no better. The United Nations prove this in Security Council debates, or in Environmental negotiation What a challenge to development economists!!!.
- ARROW, K.J; “Little’s Critique of Welfare Economics”, American Economic Reviews December, 1951. p.923.
- BOULDING, H.E.: “Welfare Economics” in Haley R.: Survey of Contemporary of Economics, Vol. II. (New York, 1952), Ch.I. p.1.
- GRAAFF, J. de V.: Theoretical Welfare Economics. (London, 1957) p.5.
- HENIG, Hog “On the Content of Welfare Economics — A Comment”. American Economic Review. September, 1951. p.500.
- HICKS, J.R.: Essays in World Economics. (Oxford, 1959), p.ix.
- HOBSON, J.A.: Work and Wealth. (Macmillan Co., London, 1916), pp.350.
- HUTCHINSON, T.W.: A Review of Economic Doctrines, 1870–1929. (Oxford, 1953) p.281.
- LITTLE, I.M.D.: Critique of Welfare Economic (Oxford, 1952).
- MAJUMDAR, T.: Measurement of Utility, (London, 1958) p.4.
- MISHAN, E.J: “Welfare Criteria for External Effects”, American Economic Review, September, 1961. p.594.
- PIGOU, A.C.: Wealth and Welfare. (London, 1912).
- PIGOU, A.C.: “Some Aspects of Welfare Economics”. American Economic Review, June 1951. p.288.
- PIGOU, A.C.: Economics of Welfare. (London, 1932), p.11.
- REDER, M.M.: Studies in the Theory of Welfare Economics. (New York, 1947) 3rd Print, 1949. p.13.
- SHANMUGASUNDARAM, Vedagiri: “Contributions of Hicks, Samuelson and Arrow to Welfare Economics”, The Indian Economic Journal, Vol.22, Conference Number, 1974. pp.25–33.
- SHANMUGASUNDARAM, Vedagiri: “Recent Development in Economic Theory – Welfare Economics”. The Journal of the Madras University, Vol. XLV, No.1. January 1973. pp.1–38.
- SHANMUGASUNDARAM, Yasodha: “Cost Benefit Analysis and Cost Effectiveness Analysis”. Indian Economic Journal. Vol.22. No.5, 1974. pp.55–61.
- STIGLER, G.J.: “New Welfare Economics”, American Economic Review, June, 1943. p.345.
- STURMEY, S.G.: Income and Economic Welfare, (London, 1959), p.2.
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